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Abstract
Since the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic in late 2019, several researchers and
decision-makers have turned to statistical modeling to inform predictions of the severity of the
burden of infection and disease in various settings. While it is understood that no model can
perfectly describe the transmission of a novel and highly transmissible pathogen, there still lies the
potential for models to be useful tools for local and international decision makers to act proactively
to mitigate the burden of disease. In Syria, these challenges are compounded by humanitarian crises
resulting from the ongoing civil war in the region. This conflict has led to significant decreases in
health system capacity and public health data collection, and has increased the number of internally
displaced populations in the country, who are particularly at risk of severe COVID-19-related
morbidity and mortality. These factors make ensuring the reliability of transmission dynamic models
more challenging, as models often rely on observed data for the estimation of key model parameters
(e.g., force of infection, mortality rates) that describe factors contributing to the transmission of
SARS-CoV-2. In response, researchers intending to apply modelling techniques to settings hosting
active humanitarian crises should tailor models to rely upon a smaller number of parameters for
which reasonably plausible estimates can be obtained, and leverage the ability of models to simulate
various scenarios (e.g., efficacy of interventions, infectiousness of variants) to inform decisionmaking in these regions.
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Introduction
As is routine when developing models to pathogens responsible for novel outbreaks, there
are several challenges to developing SARS-CoV-2 models that are generalizable to settings with
different populations who are dealing with a host of region-specific circumstances (Holmdahl et al.,
2020). In settings of humanitarian crisis, the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak has been exacerbated by
population displacement resulting from violent conflicts that had been ongoing years before the
initial outbreak in late 2019. Specific challenges to modeling SARS-CoV-2 include variation in the
reproduction number across time and geographic locations, implementation and uptake of nonpharmaceutical interventions, underlying medical risk factors of populations, environmental risk
factors, and sociopolitical contexts (Bertozzi et al., 2020). While previous studies have attempted to
forecast the transmission of the virus in settings such as refugee camps (Truelove et al., 2020),
authors have noted a host of social consequences that complicate the ability of models to produce
reliable predictions, often resulting in underestimations of the true burden of infection and disease
(Alwan, 2020). This paper will describe the unique burden of COVID-19 faced by regions
experiencing ongoing humanitarian crises, describe challenges to ensuring accuracy when modeling
outbreaks in these settings, and identify strategies to be utilized by modelers and decision-makers to
interpret COVID-19 models in these settings, using the ongoing Syrian crisis as an example.

Background
COVID-19 in Humanitarian Settings
Since the emergence of the pandemic in late 2019, there have been over 100 million cases of
COVID-19 reported globally, and over 2.6 million reported deaths. In settings where humanitarian
crises, such as violent political conflict and natural disaster-induced property destruction, are
ongoing, the burden of COVID-19 has been especially high. Humanitarian crises are often
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accompanied by forced population displacement after conflict or severe weather. According to the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, there are approximately 80 million forcibly
displaced individuals worldwide, with about 45.7 million being internally displaced, and 26.3 million
being refugees (UHNCR, 2021). Regarding COVID-19, forcibly displaced populations are
considered particularly vulnerable to the burden of COVID-19 due to factors that are both
environmental and related to the health status of these populations.
Environmental factors that result in increased risk of COVID-19 morbidity and mortality in
humanitarian settings include forced population displacement and migration triggered by major
conflict or severe weather events, and decreases in the quality of living conditions during periods of
conflict and instability. Internally displaced populations (IDPs) and refugees are believed to be at an
increased risk of COVID-19 morbidity and mortality as a result of unsustainable living conditions in
unstable political regions and camp settings; common issues faced in these settings include
overcrowding and inadequate sanitation infrastructure (Singh et al., 2020). During the initial global
spread of the SARS-CoV-2, observers at refugee camps in Somalia, Bangladesh, and Greece
reported concerns that social distancing would not be possible in camp settings, and that medical
staff equipped to treat and test for COVID-19 were not available (Subbaraman, 2020).
In addition, increasing instances of major adverse weather events have the potential to
increase the number of displaced populations globally, and have already been devastating for
populations who are already displaced (Yonetani, 2016; Potsdam, 2020). The health status of
internally displaced populations is also of particular concern, since SARS-CoV-2 infection can
exacerbate existing chronic conditions and infectious diseases in individuals, and since some of these
chronic conditions can increase the severity of COVID-19-related disease. Studies have indicated
that co-infection with SARS-CoV-2 and bacterial pathogens are associated with a higher likelihood
of mortality than those without coinfections (Lansbury et al., 2020).
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Concerns around the burden of COVID-19 among displaced populations are not purely
speculative, as evidence has indicated an increasing burden of several infectious diseases among
these populations. A review of reported outbreaks between 1996 and 2016 suggests that annual rates
of outbreaks among forcibly displaced populations have been increasing (Desai, 2020). Internally
displaced populations in various countries are believed to be at a greater risk of infectious diseases
including tuberculosis, HIV, and other infectious respiratory diseases (Castañeda-Hernández et al.,
2018; UNAIDS, 2007; Bellos et al., 2010). The risk of co-infection involving COVID-19 is further
exacerbated by the reported disruption of routine vaccination activities for measles, mumps, rubella,
polio, diphtheria, pertussis, and other vaccine preventable illnesses (VPIs) (Lassi et al., 2021). The
potential resurgence of VPIs resulting from disrupted vaccination programs combined with the
ongoing spread of SARS-CoV-2 could result epidemics of co-infection involving COVID-19,
further increasing the risk among these already vulnerable populations. In turn, it is crucial that
global public health efforts focus on studying and mitigating the effects of the virus among forcibly
displaced populations.

COVID-19 Transmission Dynamic Models
Transmission dynamic models have been some of the most powerful tools infectious
disease-oriented public health experts and decision-makers have developed and wielded in recent
years. This form of statistical modeling allows researchers and professionals to leverage existing data
on rates of disease, pathogen-specific characteristics, populations characteristics in order to develop
mathematical equations designed to predict the spread of pathogens throughout populations
temporally. Modelers often abide by the adage that “all models are wrong, but some are useful,”
which summarizes the idea that models are more useful as decision-making tools than as perfect
predictors of the spread of infectious diseases. This alludes to both the inability of any statistical
model to perfectly capture all factors that contribute to a set of given outcomes in real-world
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settings, and the potential for well-constructed and properly interpreted models to provide useful
information for proactive decision-making. Since the emergence of COVID-19 in late 2019, models
have been developed to predict rates of infection, identify potential targets for intervention, and
estimate the efficacy of interventions in various international settings.
The majority of COVID-19 compartmental models described in literature are SIR and SEIR
models, which contain components for individuals who are susceptible (S), exposed and noninfectious (E), infectious (I), and recovered (R) (Guan et al., 2020). COVID-19 models vary in the
subcategorization of these compartments, with some models including various states of
infectiousness given the varying presentations of SARS-CoV-2 infection among individuals. For
example, several researchers have studied models that include separate compartments for infectious
individuals who are asymptomatic, individuals with symptoms, and individuals who require
hospitalization as a result of severe infection (Guan et al., 2020). Advantages to subcompartmentalizing the infectious compartment include allowing for the integration of different
rates of mortality dependent on each infectious state and the potential for individuals to transition
between infectious states, as can occur in the real world (Radulescu et al., 2020). The addition of
model compartments can be a disadvantage if sufficient data are not available to inform estimates of
the length of time individuals are expected to stay in model compartments (i.e., the latent period).
Model parameters are variables estimated based on existing data, and ultimately tailor models
to specific pathogen- and region-specific factors. Common parameters in transmission dynamic
models include: the transmission parameter (represented using β), which quantifies the likelihood
that a given individual who is susceptible to infection will become infected after coming into contact
with a member of the population who is infected and infectious; the progression rate (ω), which
quantifies the likelihood that an asymptomatic infectious individual in a population will progress to
symptomatic disease after one unit of time; and the recovery rate (σ), which quantifies the likelihood
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that an infected and infectious individual will recover from the infection and no longer be infectious
after one unit of time (Del Valle et al., 2013). In addition, researchers have calculated estimates of
the force of infection (λ) and the serial interval of infection for COVID-19 models based on data on
serological screening for SARS-CoV-2 antibodies, observed symptomatic cases, and PCR-based test
results among several other types of data (Subramanian et al., 2021; Rai et al., 2021). Other
parameters such as the death rate (μ) may also be included. Depending on the number and type of
compartments selected to be included in a model, there may be few or several parameters involved
in model development. In a meta-analysis of COVID-19 models, authors found that the number of
model parameters ranged from six to 29 across 63 studies (Guan et al., 2020).
In addition to data-based parameters, assumptions are crucial to ensuring an accurate
interpretation of model results. Model assumptions are conditions that may or may not reflect realworld settings with the ultimate purpose of facilitating model development. Assumptions are
generally identified during the development of models, and describe characteristics of populations
and infectious diseases. Assumptions typically serve the function of either tailoring models to
specific pathogens and settings, or for the sake of simplifying model inputs. One assumption
encoded in models used for COVID-19 is that individuals who are asymptomatic and infectious are
believed to be less infectious than symptomatic individuals, but have a longer period of
infectiousness as suggested by the notion that asymptomatic individuals will not self-isolate
(Sayampanathan et al., 2021; Morozova et al., 2020; Childs et al., 2020). This assumption allows for
model equations, key components used for tailoring models to specific infectious agents, to take into
account differences in infectiousness that one would observe in real-world settings. Regarding model
simplification, one common assumption embedded in COVID-19 models is that population sizes
remain constant and mix homogenously, resulting in relatively stable and predictable dynamics of
interactions between individuals within populations (Cooper et al., 2020).
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Conflict in Syria
Since 2011, the protracted conflict in Syria has resulted in the forced displacement of more
than half of the pre-conflict population of 22 million. In addition to this displacement, the conflict
has resulted in widespread destruction of health systems throughout the country, particularly in the
northern region of the country, which for much of the conflict was not under control of the
Damascus government. The most current data indicates that countrywide, about 6.1 million
individuals are internally displaced, representing over one-third of the total population of 17 million
(Human Rights Watch; World Bank).

[Figure 1 Map Identifying Territorial Control in Syria (The Economist, 2020)]

Only about 50% of Syrian hospitals remaining fully functional (Health Sector, 2020). Attacks on
health facilities totally 628 by Syrian government forces, Russian government forces, the Islamic
State, and other coalition forces and unknown groups have occurred since 2016 (Physicians).
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Intentionally targeting of healthcare workers, been common in conflict zones, has left at least 930
medical professionals killed since 2011 (PHR). Disruptions in the delivery of healthcare have had
significant impacts on the health of displaced populations, most notably outbreaks of polio and
leishmaniasis that have occurred in the years since the emergence of the conflict (Mbaeyi et al., 2017;
Al-Salem, 2016). Concerns related to the delivery of care during the COVID-19 pandemic have
already been raised, as the lack of stable health infrastructure has led to difficulties in testing and
surveillance of COVID-19, as well as delivering care for severe cases (Amnesty, 2020). Given this
host of challenges, researchers seeking to utilize transmission dynamic modeling in settings where
humanitarian crises are ongoing should strive to ensure that models, and their outputs, take into
account these obstacles.

Developing COVID-19 Models for Humanitarian Crisis Settings
Infectious Disease Surveillance and Data Availability
Violent conflict and humanitarian crises are known to increase the risk of infectious disease
transmission, morbidity, and mortality due to effects including forced population displacement, the
disruption of routine vaccination activities, the destruction of sewage and water sanitation systems,
and direct attacks on healthcare workers and facilities (Ekzayez et al., 2020). These effects, in
conflict-affected settings, imperil surveillance of infectious diseases and other activities critical to
protecting the health of impacted populations. Initial outbreak detection in conflict-affected regions
largely relies upon clinical identification of patients who have symptoms consistent with infection of
known pathogens (Ismail et al., 2016). While this method is advantageous in settings lacking
laboratory diagnosis, it does not detect asymptomatic infections, novel infectious pathogens, and
infection in individuals who do not present to health facilities. As a suspected outbreak progresses,
the need for diagnostic testing rapidly becomes a necessity, which can present significant challenges
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in conflict-affected settings. In the northern regions of Syria, conflict dynamics including
fluctuations in governmental and non-governmental control of regions, targeted attacks on
healthcare facilities and workers, and inconsistent access to hard-to-reach areas have made it
especially difficult to establish a consistent system for infectious disease reporting and surveillance
(Ismail et al., 2016). For RT-PCR COVID-19 testing specifically, surveillance is even more difficult
as patient samples may require transport across national borders, a process which has resulted in
injury and death during previous outbreaks (WHO Europe).
Further complicating the establishment of a robust infectious disease surveillance system is
the need for collaborative and integrated data sharing protocols. In Syria, this challenge is
compounded by regional variation in health system oversight with the World Health Organization,
Turkey’s Assistance Coordination Unit, and different governmental and opposition-based entities
having responsibility for coordinating health-based activities in different regions throughout the
country (Coutts et al., 2015). Efforts geared towards collaboration between these entities have varied
in their success over the past nine years, but have been challenging due to the number of actors
involved, and unpredictable changes in organizational capacity and geographic control throughout
the region (Ismail et at., 2016).
The vast majority of health surveillance in northern Syria is conducted by the Assistance
Coordination Unit (ACU)’s Early Warning and Response Network (EWARN) based in Turkey in
collaboration with the WHO and CDC. Early warning systems for disease outbreaks have been
critical in identifying and addressing gaps in public health surveillance in conflict affected regions.
ACU’s EWARN was specifically designed to provide public health surveillance in areas of northern
Syria occupied by government opposition groups, and has been critical in providing data on several
diseases where standardized reporting systems were otherwise unavailable (Cordes et al., 2017). In
addition to enhancing data collection efforts, EWARN conducts training for internal staff every
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three months, as well as for health workers in non-governmental organizations throughout Syria.
EWARN has operated in northern Syria since the collapse of the health system in mid-2013, and
was responsible for reporting the first cluster of polio cases in the region that same year (Ekzayez et
al., 2020).
Surveillance of COVID-19 in humanitarian settings is plagued by a host of disease-specific
challenges. Since most cases of COVID-19 either produce mild symptoms or are asymptomatic,
relying solely on syndromic surveillance would result in significant underestimates, and potentially
misdiagnoses of the disease (Alawa et al., 2020). This being the case, tests involving laboratory
confirmation of the SARS-CoV-2 virus are preferred to more accurately capture the burden of
disease in populations. This makes surveillance of COVID-19 especially challenging, since
humanitarian settings that contain refugee camps and populations with high rates of internal
displacement are known to have inadequate access to testing equipment, health workers trained to
conduct testing, and laboratories required to process samples (Lau et al., 2020). While there have
been efforts by local and international stakeholders to use limited resources to test high-risk
populations in these settings, case counts are generally thought to be underestimates given the
increased risk of transmission and lack of consistent and widespread testing.

Estimating Model Parameters
Population Mobility Dynamics
In northern Syria, where most camps for the internally displaced are located. there is no
system of civil registration and no comprehensive mortality surveillance system. Data on both of
these measures are necessary for calculating birth and death rates in the population, therefore those
attempting to parameterize changes in this population must make the decision to use existing
sources on Syrian populations with incomplete data, use estimates for regions other than Syria (e.g.,
global death rate), or make assumptions about the changes in the size of the population. Another
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common assumption of models describing the transmission of COVID-19 is that individuals within
populations are assumed to mix homogenously over time (Britton et al., 2020). This assumption is
made in models describing several infectious diseases, despite existing knowledge on the potential
effects of non-homogenous population mixing on the final size of epidemics (Cui et al., 2018). This
assumption is typically made since attempting to account for all factors that describe nonhomogenous population mixing across populations would result in models that are more complex
than particularly useful. Despite its common appearance in descriptions of transmission dynamic
models, this assumption has been the subject of critique among epidemiologists, who are often
concerned with how heterogeneity of exposures within populations can lead to different health
outcomes (Bansal et al., 2007).
When attempting to more accurately describe population movement, modelers have used
network-based models to encode characteristics of population mixing (e.g., clustering of individuals
within the same age group) to produce more reliable model results (Pastor-Satorras, 2001). While
network-based models are particularly useful for the goal of encoding heterogenous population
mixing, their reliability depends on the availability of data on population mixing and clustering, as
well as the likelihood that target populations will behave predictably over time. In the context of
forced displacement, fluctuations in migration following major violent conflict or climate events are
difficult to anticipate in models not specifically designed to address such a scenario. Mass migration
following violent conflict events and natural disasters can make it particularly difficult to produce
reliable estimates to inform the development of network-based models (IOM, 2020). One alternative
to network modeling has been explored for COVID-19 by adjusting the number of expected
contacts a given individual will have based on their level of socialization, which could be a useful
strategy in settings where detailed population data is not available (Britton et al., 2020).
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Estimating the Force of Infection
One of the key parameters included in epidemiologic transmission dynamic models is the
force of infection, commonly denoted using λ. This parameter describes the rate at which
susceptible individuals are expected to become infected, and is estimated using data on new
infections, exposure of susceptible individuals to infectious individuals, and the average duration of
exposure in outbreak settings (Hens, 2009). Calculations of the force of infection differ based on
whether the transmission of pathogens is believed to be density- or frequency-dependent. For
models assuming density-dependent transmission, in which the force of infection increases with
population size, the equation is as follows, with t indicating a unit of time, b indicating the
transmission parameter, and I representing the number of infectious individuals at a given time.
𝜆(𝑡) = 𝛽 ∗ 𝐼(𝑡)
For models assuming frequency-dependent transmission, in which the force of infection is primarily
dependent on the proportion of infectious individuals in the population, the calculation is as follows.
𝜆(𝑡) = 𝛽 ∗ 𝐼(𝑡)/𝑁(𝑡)
While the transmission parameter, b, is used to describe the average number of people an infected
individual is expected to expose to disease over a given unit of time, the force of infection more
directly accounts for the likelihood than an exposed susceptible individual will become infected. In
general, estimates of the force of infection for a given pathogen are only as reliable as the data being
used in calculations.
Obtaining rates on the number of new COVID-19 infections to inform estimates of
infection has generally been challenging for epidemiologists, as unreported infection is believed to
have been a significant contributor to the rapid spread of SARS-CoV-2 (Li et al., 2020). Some
models designed to predict COVID-19 have included parameters identifying rates of case detection
and reporting to account for gaps in testing and reporting (Centre, 2020). This can be a useful
15

method of better predicting the burden of COVID-19 within populations, but in the Syrian context
producing a reliable estimate of under-detection presents a set of challenges. Cases may go
undetected when infected individuals who receive a test receive false-negative results, or when
infected individuals do not undergo testing at all (Reese et al., 2020). While data on false-negative
results may be transferable across various contexts if all parties are using the same test, data on
uninfected untested individuals is not readily available for internally displaced populations living in
Syria. One strategy to collect data to inform these estimates would be to conduct antibody-based
seroprevalence surveys to identify the prevalence of individuals who have ever had COVID-19,
however these studies require significant amounts of staffing, resources, and coordination (including
having access to individuals during appropriate sampling times), all of which are documented
challenges for Syrian health system (Angulo et al., 2021; Douedari & Howard, 2019).
Encoding Risk of Asymptomatic Infection
Given existing data on the differential impacts of symptomatic versus asymptomatic disease
on COVID-19 morbidity, mortality, and infectiousness, COVID-19 models often contain multiple
infectious states to differentiate between different stages of infection (Subramanian, 2021). As
addressed above, the distinction between these states is important not only to more accurately
reflect how the disease manifests among members of the population, but also allows modelers to
account for differences in mobility and mixing trends between the two groups (e.g.., asymptomatic
populations may engage in more mixing than symptomatic populations who self-isolate). One
challenge for applying models that contain multiple compartments for distinct infectious states it
that data involved in the estimation of these parameters has primarily been collected in settings that
are not currently experiencing humanitarian crises to the degree of conflict-affected settings
(Faskianos, 2020).
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Estimating the number of susceptible individuals exposed in a given unit of time is
complicated by the fact that approximately 17-20% of COVID-19 infections are asymptomatic,
while asymptomatic cases are believed to be responsible for at least half of transmission events
based on a meta-analysis of relevant studies (Byambasuren et al., 2020; Johansson et al., 2021).
Determining the rate at which members in a given population will become infected and
asymptomatic as opposed to symptomatic is another challenged faced by COVID-19 models.
Although studies have identified smoking, pre-existing lung damage and disease, obesity, and older
age as risk factors for developing symptomatic COVID-19, research is still being conducted on what
factors are associated with the development of either symptomatic or asymptomatic disease (Tao et
al., 2020; Hopkinson et al, 2021; Tartof et al., 2020).

Mortality Estimates
Mortality surveillance is a key component of any properly functioning health system. A
comprehensive system of mortality surveillance can allow rapid detection of health crises occurring
in specific geographic regions, age-groups, and other subpopulations, while also serving as a
reference for healthcare workers and decision-makers to assess the efficacy of interventions designed
to reduce the burden of mortality (Fottrell, 2009). In addition, mortality surveillance data can serve
as a reference from which health services and equipment can be allocated following major events
that result in the death of several individuals, including violent conflict events. Challenges in
ensuring adequate mortality surveillance typically fall under two categories: (1) reliably capturing the
number of deaths in particular regions over time, and (2) ensuring accurate reporting of the cause of
death for individuals (Checchi, 2018). In conflict-affected settings, several context-specific factors
have negative impacts on the collection of robust, reliable data on mortality due to factors such as
forced population displacement, changing dynamics of geopolitical control across geographic
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regions, and a lack of trained staff dedicated to collecting data, among several other factors (Levy et
al., 2016).
During an ongoing crisis in which mortality data has not been collected for significant period
of time, it would be advantageous to collect retrospective mortality data as well as to establish a
protocol for collecting mortality data prospectively (Checchi, 2018). Retrospective mortality data is
critical for estimating a baseline mortality rate to which prospective mortality data can be compared.
Several strategies for collecting both retrospective and prospective mortality data in conflict-affected
settings have been described in public health literature, which also identifies key context-dependent
strategies. For example, in refugee camps or urban settings where populations are relatively
stationary and easy to reach, data collection in the form of a survey administered by home visitors is
generally advised as a method of collecting both retrospective and prospective data on mortality
(Checchi, 2018). Additionally, in crisis-affected settings where nutritional surveillance that utilizes
small-site-based surveys is ongoing, survey tools can be modified to capture data on mortality within
these regions (Checchi, 2018). Ultimately, the selected method for mortality data collection should
be the most feasible given the conflict and migration dynamics of targeted regions.
To assess the impact of COVID-19 on mortality, calculating an estimate for excess mortality
attributable to the disease would be ideal (Setel et al., 2020). However, in humanitarian settings,
producing this calculation is particularly challenging due to difficulties in obtaining a reliable estimate
of pre-COVID and mortality due to the challenges described above, as well as a reliable estimate of
mortality mid-pandemic. Without a standardized system for capturing mortality data that remains
somewhat consistent during pandemic and non-pandemic periods, estimates of excess death will
likely be unreliable.
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Strategies for Model Adaptation
Parameter Estimation
As described above, using forecasting models to estimate of the number of COVID-19 cases
over time in settings with unstable population dynamics and limited data on infection and other
related health and socioeconomic factors is likely to result in unreliable estimates that will likely have
limited utility. This notion highlights the importance of parameter selection and quantification in
models, which have direct implications on model estimates and behavior. Parameters should be
selected based on an assessment of the necessity of the parameter for model function (e.g., duration
of infectiousness is likely a key parameter), and the reliability and availability of data used to inform
parameter estimates in a given region. The inclusion of too few parameters may result in models that
are not specific enough to describe the transmission dynamics of COVID-19 specifically, and the
inclusion of too many parameters, especially in cases where data used to inform parameter estimates
is not sufficiently validated, may result in increases in the uncertainty of model estimates. An
example of how including too many parameters for which there are not sufficient data to produce
reliable parameter estimates can be observed in the case of the CovidSim model.
CovidSim is an epidemiological model by the Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team,
designed to predict the transmission dynamics and burden of COVID-19. This model was used to
guide COVID-19-related policy development in the United Kingdom at the onset of the outbreak in
March 2020, highlighting the impact that transmission dynamic models have on public health
decision-making in the real world (Edeling et al., 2021). CovidSim contains over 900 input
parameters, ranging from COVID-19-specific disease parameters, like the latent period and duration
of infectiousness, to intervention parameters, such as the average length of time individuals selfisolate after testing positive for infection (Edeling et al., 2021). Given the large number of
parameters included in the model, concerns surrounding parameter uncertainty are relevant to the
19

assessment of the model’s reliability. Uncertainty in this case refers to the inclusion of parameter
estimates that are probabilistic and uncertain, since estimates are often based upon available, and
potentially biased, data sources (Briggs et al., 2012). Other sources of uncertainty in CovidSim relate
to the model structure (e.g., the impact of including an ‘Exposed’ state on model results), and
scenarios in which models are applied (e.g., the appropriateness of including intervention measures
as model paramters). To address the effect of these sources of uncertainty on CovidSim estimates,
Edeling and colleagues conducted a parametric sensitivity analysis and uncertainty quantification on
19 parameters, and found that model outputs were impacted by up to 300% based on scenarios
observed by the authors (Edeling et al., 2021). Overall, the authors found that biases in observed
data, which directly informed parameter estimates, had a significantly negative impact on model
reliability.
The lessons learned from CovidSim are particularly relevant in settings hosting active
humanitarian crises, such as Syria, given inconsistent data collection and availability on important
factors used to inform parameter estimation, including population dynamics that may vary between
regions and types of settings (e.g., urban centers, camp settings). As such, those seeking to develop
and utilize models in Syria, and settings facing similar challenges, should attempt to strike a balance
between the inclusion of an adequate number of estimable parameters to tailor models to COVID19, while avoiding including so many unknown parameters that model estimates become too
unreliable. In addition to the careful selection of parameters to include in model equations, modelers
and decision-makers should leverage the flexibility of models to analyze the predicted outcomes of
models relative to various potential scenarios.

Modeling Multiple Scenarios
Rather than using models to produce estimates of the expected number of cases, researchers
attempting to use models in crisis settings should focus on how variations in parameter estimates
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can describe various real-world scenarios. With this strategy, modelers can simulate a variety of
potential scenarios by adjusting parameter estimates, and analyze model outputs relatively to support
decision-making and policy recommendations. Models that are designed with the primary purpose
of predicting the number of COVID-19 cases within a given population are typically known as
statistical models, although compartmental models often contain components that are based on
statistical estimation as well (Becker et al., 2021). Given significant gaps in data on infection related
statistics, several parameters in models describing rates of transmission among populations in
humanitarian settings rely on estimates that are based on incomplete data, or calculated using data
from other settings that may not be applicable. In response to these concerns related to data
reliability, studies involving model-based simulations of outbreak scenarios in Syria, and similar
settings, would likely benefit from reporting estimates for a number of different scenarios encoded
by varying model estimates.
For example, one study conducted by faculty at the London School of Economics and
Political Science presented results of a COVID-19 model geared towards forecasting the burden of
disease presented the results of various SIR model simulations with differing R0 (and by extension β)
values (Mehchy & Turkmani, 2020). For this study, the authors modeled three scenarios describing
different levels of public awareness and public health intervention, each encoded by R0 values
ranging from 1.5 to 3; in addition, the authors modeled a phased approach in which assumed R0
values decreased from 3 to 1.5 over the period of one month. As anticipated, an R0 value
representing no action (3) resulted in high rates of infection and death, while R0 values representing
increasing levels of intervention and public awareness (1.5) resulted in lower rates of infection and
death; the phased model indicated that increasing levels of intervention over time would lead to
increases in the proportion of recovered individuals in the population.
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Although this model produced results forecasting an actual number of COVID-19 cases, the
authors’ observation of the behavior of the model was perhaps the main takeaway. By observing the
relationships between the number of infected, susceptible, and deceased individuals observed in
different model scenarios, the authors illustrate the fact that swift and properly implemented
interventions likely have significant impacts on the number of people expected to be impacted by
the virus in addition to the expected outcomes of the population of individuals who become
infected. This case is a prime example of how models can be used to inform decisions around
intervention strategies and timing, despite concerns around data reliability and parameter estimation.
Given that these concerns are common to several regions hosting ongoing humanitarian crises, the
idea approaching and using models as malleable and observable tools rather than a static set of
equations and outputs should be kept in mind by those seeking to use models for research and
decision-making. This strategy has already been utilized in studies observing different effects based
on the timing of lockdowns and varying levels of mask use within populations, and can be utilized to
study other factors affecting transmission dynamics that are becoming increasingly relevant as the
pandemic continues (Oraby et al., 2021; IHME, 2021).

Future Directions
At the current stage of the COVID-19 pandemic, three areas of study will become
particularly relevant to model construction and analysis. First, the efficacy and adherence to nonpharmaceutical interventions (e.g., social distancing, travel restrictions) is a critical parameter to
define and quantify, since the success of evidence-based interventions are reliant upon the extent to
which populations actually participate. In Syria, and other settings hosting ongoing humanitarian
crises, this is a particularly important area for research given challenges in ensuring adequate
resources and staffing in order to fully implement interventions such as wearing face masks and selfisolating after receiving a positive test result. In camp settings hosting large numbers of internally
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displaced individuals, even seemingly simple prevention measures such as social distancing are not
possible due to high population density (Subbaraman, 2020). Given these challenges, it may be
advantageous for COVID-19 modelers to assess the relative impacts of multiple interventions, with
parameter estimates that indicate low levels of adherence to a series of interventions. Using this
strategy, researchers may be able to determine a set of interventions that, when implemented
concurrently, would have a high likelihood of mitigating the burden of disease even if interventions
suffered issues related to adherence. This strategy echoes findings published by the Imperial College
COVID-19 Response team in March 2020, which suggest that multiple concurrent interventions
have a higher likelihood of having an impact on transmission than one intervention alone (Ferguson
et al., 2020).
Second, the increasing availability of vaccines with different levels of efficacy at preventing
infection, transmission, severe disease morbidity, and mortality will likely result in a decreased risk
for each of these factors, dependent on the types of vaccines delivered and the rate of coverage in a
given population. In Syria, the first batch of vaccines are expected to be allocated to the most
vulnerable populations who are accessible in the region (e.g., the oldest individuals in zones not
experiencing active conflict) (Human Rights Watch, 2021). Analyzing variations in coverage and
types of vaccines may provide information on the proportion of individuals in high-risk groups that
need to be vaccinated in order for notable reductions in disease burden to occur. This information
could be used to inform vaccine distribution strategies to ensure that an adequate number of
vaccines are distributed across regions.
Third, the emergence of new variants must be taken into account, especially considering the
increased risk of mortality documented for the B.1.1.7 variant in the United Kingdom, and the
uncertainty surrounding the efficacy of vaccines against newly emerging variants (Collins, 2021). For
each of these topics, data to inform parameter estimates are still being collected as the pandemic
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unfolds. Given the lack of comprehensive data in each of these areas, it is likely that models that
assess different scenarios characterized by variations in said parameters (e.g., efficacy of
interventions, vaccination rates in a given region, infectiousness of new strains) will be able to
provide more useful information than models that attempt to forecast the burden of disease using
one scenario based on fixed parameter estimates.

Conclusion
It is important for model developers to communicate regularly with decision-makers who
may not have a strong foundation in statistical analysis for two reasons. First, modelers must ensure
that model results are interpreted correctly, as to avoid misunderstandings about the reliability of
model outputs compared to real-world scenarios. These discussions should make clear that models
will rarely be able to provide an exact number of cases that will occur in the future, but that models
have the potential to describe how one or several factors may significantly exacerbate or mitigate the
burden of infection and disease. Second, modelers should construct models based on answerable
questions that come from decision-makers to ensure that modelling remains a useful tool in policy
development and intervention design. An example of this can be seen in reports describing results of
the OCHA-Bucky Model, which is designed to model COVID-19 cases and deaths in countries
hosting active humanitarian crises. Weekly reports include estimates of new cases alongside
recommendations for the intensity of control efforts to be enacted by local public health
stakeholders and decision-makers (Centre, 2020). In settings of humanitarian crisis where the burden
of disease is expected to be high, but model reliability is limited by a host of conflict-related factors,
it is especially important to ensure that any models used to inform decision-making are constructed
and utilized in ways that acknowledge the nature of these conflicts and potential statistical
limitations.
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